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**Chinese influence in Cuba is high – that spills over to broader Latin American countries.**

**PLNA 11/7,** Prensa Latina News Agency, 2013, “Chinese President Stresses Importance of Relations with Cuba,” http://en.escambray.cu/2013/chinese-president-stresses-importance-of-relations-with-cuba/)//DR. H

Xi Jinping stressed the great importance China grants to its relations with Cuba, and said the two nations should continue high-level exchanges, share experiences, and deepen cooperation in the international arena.

His criteria were expressed during a meeting with Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez, who concluded today an official visit to this country.

The Chinese leader recalled earlier meetings with President Raul Castro and Fidel Castro, and said that Cuba and China are good friends, partners, and brothers.

Xi, who is a general secretary of the Communist Party of China and chairman of the Central Military Commission, received the Cuban foreign minister, member of the Political Bureau of the Communist Party of Cuba, at the Great People’s Palace in this capital.

The Chinese leader recalled earlier meetings with President Raul Castro and the historic leader of the Cuban Revolution, Fidel Castro, and stressed that Cuba and China are good friends, partners, and brothers.

He insisted in the great importance China grants to its ties with the Caribbean nation, and stated that the two sides should promote relations from the Asian country with Latin American and Caribbean countries.

**Changes in US-Cuba policy effect overall influence in Latin America – crowds China out.**

**Doherty 8** (Patrick, "An Obama Policy for Cuba," McClathy Newspapers, December 12, cuba.newamerica.net/publications/articles/2008/obama\_policy\_cuba\_9301)

With his national security team in place, President-elect Barack Obama's foreign policy principals will be immediately struck by how many complex and expensive challenges they will face. Iraq, Iran, Pakistan, Afghanistan, Israel-Palestine and Russia, will all require enormous energy, all the tools in our foreign policy toolbox, and will all take years to resolve, if they can be resolved. None of these crises will allow President Obama to signal swiftly to the world the kind of changes he proposes in American foreign policy. In contrast, **U.S.-Cuba policy is low-hanging fruit:** though of marginal importance domestically, it could be changed immediately at little cost. At present, that policy is a major black spot on America's international reputation. For the rest of the world, our failed, obsolete and 50-year old policy toward Cuba goes against everything that Obama campaigned for, and the recent 185-3 U.N. vote to condemn the centerpiece of that policy, the embargo – the 16th such vote in as many years – makes that clear. **The entire world believes our policy is wrong**. And the world is right. The fact is that since Cuba stopped exporting revolution and started exporting doctors and nurses, it ceased being a national security concern for the United States. And yet we restrict travel to the island - unconstitutionally - and constrain Cuban-Americans in the amount of money they can send to their families on the island. Moreover, the economic embargo hurts the Cuban people more than the Cuban leadership, and our Helms-Burton legislation imposes Washington's will on foreign businesses who wish to trade with Cuba, creating ill will in business communities from Canada to Brazil. **Our Cuba policy is also an obstacle to striking a new relationship with the nations of Latin America**. Any 21st-century policy toward Latin America will have to shift from the Cold War-era emphasis on right-wing governments and top-down economic adjustment to creating a hemispheric partnership to address many critical issues: the revival of militant leftism, the twin challenges of sustainability and inclusive economic growth, and the rising hemispheric influence of Russia and China. But until Washington ends the extraordinary sanctions that comprise the Cuba embargo, Latin America will remain at arms-length, and the problems in our backyard - Hugo Chavez, drugs, immigration, energy insecurity - will simply fester.

**Chinese influence in Latin America is key to maintain their economic growth.**

**Arnson et al. ‘9** (Cynthia Anderson, Mark Mohr, Riordan Roett, writers for Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, “Enter the Dragon? China’s Presence in Latin America”, http://www.wilsoncenter.org/sites/default/files/EnterDragonFinal.pdf) (JN)

China’s role in Latin America is, above all, based on trade, despite U.S. concerns about China’s military inﬂuence in Latin America. The major exception to this rule is Cuba, for which China represents a political relationship as well as one based on economic interests. Although Venezuelan authorities may also prefer that its relationship with China have political as well as economic dimensions, it is not clear that China has the same expectations of its relationship with Venezuela. To China, Latin America **represents a signiﬁcant source of the necessary natural resources** that will help China **maintain its economic growth**. Due primarily to trade with China, Latin America’s trade volume grew from $2.8 billion in 1988 to $49 billion in 2005. Also, and as publicly announced, China intends to surpass $180 billion in trade with Latin America by 2010, not only due to the country’s need for natural resources, but also as a result of China’s intention to diversify and expand its markets in the region. Thus, Latin America represents a substantial market for Chinese goods.

**Chinese economic decline causes great power war.**

**Kane 01** [Thomas Kane, PhD in Security Studies from the University of Hull & Lawrence Serewicz, Autumn, <http://www.carlisle.army.mil/usawc/Parameters/01autumn/Kane.htm>]

Despite China's problems with its food supply, the Chinese do not appear to be in danger of widespread starvation. Nevertheless, one cannot rule out the prospect entirely, especially if the earth's climate actually is getting warmer. The consequences of general famine in a country with over a billion people clearly would be catastrophic. The effects of oil shortages and industrial stagnation would be less lurid, but economic collapse would endanger China's political stability whether that collapse came with a bang or a whimper. PRC society has become dangerously fractured. As the coastal cities grow richer and more cosmopolitan while the rural inland provinces grow poorer, the political interests of the two regions become ever less compatible. Increasing the prospects for division yet further, Deng Xiaoping's administrative reforms have strengthened regional potentates at the expense of central authority. As Kent Calder observes, In part, this change [erosion of power at the center] is a conscious devolution, initiated by Deng Xiaoping in 1991 to outflank conservative opponents of economic reforms in Beijing nomenclature. But devolution has fed on itself, spurred by the natural desire of local authorities in the affluent and increasingly powerful coastal provinces to appropriate more and more of the fruits of growth to themselves alone.[ 49] Other social and economic developments deepen the rifts in Chinese society. The one-child policy, for instance, is disrupting traditional family life, with unknowable consequences for Chinese mores and social cohesion.[ 50] As families resort to abortion or infanticide to ensure that their one child is a son, the population may come to include an unprecedented preponderance of young, single men. If common gender prejudices have any basis in fact, these males are unlikely to be a source of social stability. Under these circumstances, China is vulnerable to unrest of many kinds. Unemployment or severe hardship, not to mention actual starvation, could easily trigger popular uprisings. Provincial leaders might be tempted to secede, perhaps openly or perhaps by quietly ceasing to obey Beijing's directives. China's leaders, in turn, might adopt drastic measures to forestall such developments. If faced with internal strife, supporters of China's existing regime may return to a more overt form of communist dictatorship. The PRC has, after all, oscillated between experimentation and orthodoxy continually throughout its existence. Spectacular examples include Mao's Hundred Flowers campaign and the return to conventional Marxism-Leninism after the leftist experiments of the Cultural Revolution, but the process continued throughout the 1980s, when the Chinese referred to it as the "fang-shou cycle." (Fang means to loosen one's grip; shou means to tighten it.)[ 51] If order broke down, the Chinese would not be the only people to suffer. Civil unrest in the PRC would disrupt trade relationships, send refugees flowing across borders, and force outside powers to consider intervention. If different countries chose to intervene on different sides, China's struggle could lead to major war. In a less apocalyptic but still grim scenario, China's government might try to ward off its demise by attacking adjacent countries.

**Text: The United States federal government should**

**-offer to return Guantánamo naval base to Cuba on the condition that Cuba accepts all of the prisoners.**

**-continue to enforce sanctions against its engagement with Cuba.**

**-no longer enforce sanctions on other countries engaging with Cuba.**

**CP solves – prerequisite to normalization of relations.**

**Landau and Brenner 8/3** (Saul Landau is a Senior Fellow at the Institute for Policy Studies, Philip Brenner is a professor of international relations at American University and co-editor of A Contemporary Cuba Reader, 8/3/13, “A Simple Solution,” http://www.huffingtonpost.com/saul-landau/a-simple-solution\_b\_3700652.html)//DR. H

President Barack Obama has a simple way to solve his Guantánamo dilemma. Five years after the president promised to close the detention center for alleged terrorists the prison remains open and continues to leave a stain on the honor and integrity of the United States and its proclaimed commitment to universal human rights.

With a brief and unambiguous message to Cuba's President Raúl Castro, President Obama could offer to return Guantánamo naval base to Cuba on the condition that Cuba accept all of the prisoners. In one act the United States would rid itself of a loathsome prison and prisoners it has been unable to send anywhere else, open the way to repairing a sixty-year old dysfunctional relationship with Cuba, and repatriate territory that all Latin Americans -- not just Cubans -- have long viewed with resentment as a symbol of U.S. imperial behavior in the hemisphere. **It would be the single most significant action that could break through the barriers of distrust and misunderstanding both countries have erected.**

Most Americans don't know the history of Guantánamo. Under the terms of the 1902 Platt Amendment -- a relic of the Spanish-American war that allowed us to control Cuba's affairs -- the United States forced Cuba to give it a 99-year lease for the 47 square-mile territory on which it built the Guantánamo base. In 1934 President Franklin Roosevelt abrogated the Platt Amendment as a good neighbor gesture, but pressured Cuba to sign a new Guantánamo lease, this time with no end date. Following the 1991 Haitian coup, the United States rediscovered Guantánamo's utility, as a refugee camp for escaping Haitians unwanted in the United States. After the 9/11 attacks the military converted the camp to a high security prison.

To be sure, several matters would need to be negotiated in order to implement this "simple" solution. Apart from the disposition of the base facilities, the two countries would need to agree on the latitude Cuba would have with regard to the prisoners. For example, the United States might seek assurances that Cuba would prevent the travel of released prisoners to the United States or a U.S. territory.

But once positive energy vibrates through U.S.-Cuba diplomacy, many of the disagreements between the two countries would emerge as soluble, as solutions build on one another to engender confidence. It is likely that even before the details of returning the naval base to Cuba were settled, the two countries might be able to overcome the most vexing, immediate source of irritation between them.

The United States holds in federal prisons four Cuban agents convicted of espionage, and Cuba holds an employee of a U.S. Agency for International Development subcontractor convicted of "acts against the independence or territorial integrity of the state." Just as we have swapped prisoners with Russia and other adversaries, there is nothing stopping us from exchanging Mr. Gross for the four and allowing them all to return to their homes.

Similarly, Cuba has successfully negotiated agreements over expropriated property with every country except the United States. The typical debt-for-equity formula Cuba has used could resolve this fifty-year old issue to the benefit of U.S. citizens and corporations, and might even open the way to new U.S. investment in Cuba.

Or consider that the United States and Cuba already have achieved impressive levels of cooperation in areas of mutual concern - such as drug interdiction and natural disaster preparation - which would be even more effective if the engagements could be deepened, institutionalized, and undertaken without fear of domestic repercussions.

The U.S.-Cuba relationship has baffled ten previous U.S. presidents. It is source of tension between the United States and nearly all of the countries in Latin America. There is no objective reason for it to continue this way, along a hostile road. Solving the Cuba problem is one certain way that President Obama could keep his promises in 2009 to forge a new relationship with Latin America based on mutual respect and have a positive foreign policy legacy. Cuba has indicated a sincere desire to enter into discussions with the United States on all bilateral issues of concern between the two countries, but until now the United States has responded with a self-defeating aloofness.

As dozens of Guantánamo detainees continue their hunger strike, and a ruling about force-feeding them remains in limbo between different federal courts, the moment is ripe for President Obama to act with courage and decisiveness. Guantánamo gives him the opportunity of turning a lemon into lemonade.

**Engagement with Cuba is appeasement**

**Rubin ‘11 -** Labor Law Attorney and Washington Post Journalist, quotes the chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, quotes a report by the Associated Press, quotes the former deputy national security advisor, (Jennifer, August 18, 2011, “Obama’s Cuba appeasement”, http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/right-turn/post/obamas-cuba-appeasement/2011/03/29/gIQAjuL2tL\_blog.html )//HH

The chairwoman of the foreign affairs committee, Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen was equally irate: “According to news reports, the Administration attempted to barter for the freedom of wrongly imprisoned U.S. citizen Alan Gross by offering to return Rene Gonzalez, a convicted Cuban spy who was involved in the murder of innocent American citizens. If true, such a swap would demonstrate the outrageous willingness of the Administration to engage with the regime in Havana, which is designated by the U.S. as a state-sponsor of terrorism. Regrettably, this comes as no surprise as this Administration has never met a dictatorship with which it didn’t try to engage. It seems that a rogue regime cannot undertake a deed so dastardly that the Obama Administration would abandon engagement, even while talking tough with reporters. **Cuba is a state-sponsor of terrorism. We should not be trying to barter with them.** We must demand the unconditional release of Gross, not engage in a quid-pro-quo with tyrants.”

As bad as a prisoner exchange would have been, the administration actions didn’t stop there. The [Associated Press](http://www.usatoday.com/news/washington/story/2011-10-14/cuba-imprisoned-american-swap/50767012/1?csp=34news)reported, “The Gross-Gonzalez swap was raised by former New Mexico Gov. Bill Richardson, as well as by senior U.S. officials in a series of meetings with Cuban officials. Richardson traveled to Cuba last month seeking Gross’ release. He also told Cuban Foreign Minister Bruno Rodriguez that the U.S. would be willing to consider other areas of interest to Cuba. Among them was removing Cuba from the U.S. list of state sponsors of terrorism; reducing spending on Cuban democracy promotion programs like the one that led to the hiring of Gross; authorizing U.S. companies to help Cuba clean up oil spills from planned offshore drilling; improving postal exchanges; ending a program that makes it easier for Cuban medical personnel to move to the United States; and licensing the French company Pernod Ricard to sell Havana Club rum in the United States.”

Former deputy national security adviser [Elliott Abrams explained](http://blogs.cfr.org/abrams/2011/10/14/trading-away-cuba-policy/#more-2032), “It is especially offensive that we were willing to negotiate over support for democracy in Cuba, for that would mean that the unjust imprisonment of Gross had given the Castro dictatorship a significant victory. The implications for those engaged in similar democracy promotion activities elsewhere are clear: local regimes would think that imprisoning an American might be a terrific way to get into a negotiation about ending such activities. Every American administration faces tough choices in these situations, but the Obama administration has made a great mistake here. Our support for democracy should not be a subject of negotiation with the Castro regime.”

The administration’s conduct is all the more galling given the behavior of the Castro regime. Our willingness to relax sanctions was not greeted with goodwill gestures, let alone systemic reforms. To the contrary, this was the setting for Gross’s imprisonment. So naturally the administration orders up more of the same.

Throughout his tenure, President Obama has failed to comprehend the cost-benefit analysis that despotic regimes undertake. He has offered armfuls of goodies and promised quietude on human rights; the despots’ behavior has worsened. **There is simply no downside for rogue regimes to take their shots at the United States.**

Whether it is Cuba or [Iran,](http://www.nationalreview.com/corner/280214/iran-dangerous-and-diplomacy-has-failed-jamie-m-fly) the administration reverts to “engagement” mode when its engagement efforts are met with aggression and/or domestic oppression. Try to murder a diplomat on U.S. soil? We’ll sit down and chat. Grab an American contractor and try him in a kangaroo court? We’ll trade prisoners and talk about relaxing more sanctions. Invade Georgia, imprison political opponents and interfere with attempts to restart the peace process? We’ll put the screws on our democratic ally to get you into World Trade Organization. The response of these thuggish regimes is entirely predictable and, from their perspective, completely logical. What is inexplicable is the Obama administration’s willingness to throw gifts to tyrants in the expectation they will reciprocate in kind.

**Single issues aren’t key to cred.**

**Lake, 10–** Professor of Social Sciences, distinguished professor of political science at UC San Diego (David A., “Making America Safe for the World: Multilateralism and the Rehabilitation of US authority”, http://dss.ucsd.edu/~dlake/documents/LakeMakingAmericaSafe.pdf)//DR. H

President Obama and his administration appear to recognize the need to bolster the authority and legitimacy of the United States in the world. But virtue alone cannot provide credible guarantees against future US opportunism. Unipolarity is an enabling condition that persists. **The problem of credibility is structural, and not one that a new administration can solve simply by a new style or approach to foreign policy.** Ironically, to safeguard its authority requires that the United States embed its coercive capabilities even deeper into multilateral institutions that can provide real checks on potential opportunism.

#### “Credibility” is irrelevant – states will evaluate threats based off current capabilities and interests – basically every academic study is on our side and you’ll only have evidence from think tankers and pundits.

Fettweis 08 – Professor of political science at Tulane (Christopher, “Credibility and the War on Terror,” Winter 2008, Political Science Quarterly)//Bwang

\*Sociology and Evidence proves.

Since Vietnam, scholars have been generally unable to identify cases in which high credibility helped the United States achieve its goals. The shortterm aftermath of the Cuban Missile Crisis, for example, did not include a string of Soviet reversals, or the kind of benign bandwagoning with the West that deterrence theorists would have expected. In fact, the perceived reversal in Cuba seemed to harden Soviet resolve. As the crisis was drawing to a close, Soviet diplomat Vasily Kuznetsov angrily told his counterpart, "You Americans will never be able to do this to us again."37 Kissinger commented in his memoirs that "the Soviet Union thereupon launched itself on a determined, systematic, and long-term program of expanding all categories of its military power .... The 1962 Cuban crisis was thus a historic turning point-but not for the reason some Americans complacently supposed."38 The reassertion of the credibility of the United States, which was done at the brink of nuclear war, had few long-lasting benefits. The Soviets seemed to learn the wrong lesson. There is actually scant evidence that other states ever learn the right lessons. Cold War history contains little reason to believe that the credibility of the superpowers had very much effect on their ability to influence others. Over the last decade, a series of major scholarly studies have cast further doubt upon the fundamental assumption of interdependence across foreign policy actions. Employing methods borrowed from social psychology rather than the economics-based models commonly employed by deterrence theorists, Jonathan Mercer argued that threats are far more independent than is commonly believed and, therefore, that reputations are not likely to be formed on the basis of individual actions.39 While policymakers may feel that their decisions send messages about their basic dispositions to others, most of the evidence from social psychology suggests otherwise. Groups tend to interpret the actions of their rivals as situational, dependent upon the constraints of place and time. Therefore, they are not likely to form lasting impressions of irresolution from single, independent events. Mercer argued that the interdependence assumption had been accepted on faith, and rarely put to a coherent test; when it was, it almost inevitably failed.40

**Cuba’s not key to Latin American relations, or plan hurts them**

**Suchlicki 2k.** (Jaime, University of Miami, s Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History ¶ and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban ¶ and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. June “The U.S. Embargo of Cuba” http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf)

**Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations**. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, and transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. **Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda**. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

**Perception of waning relations with Cuba’s inevitable.**

**Hanson and Lee ’13** - Senior Production Editors at CFR (Updated: 1/31/13, Stephanie, Brianna, Council on Foreign Relations, “U.S.-Cuba Relations”,

http://www.cfr.org/cuba/us-cuba-relations/p11113#p5)

\*ideological differences over politics, human rights, gitmo, Cuban exile community.

What is the main obstacle in U.S.-Cuban relations? **A fundamental incompatibility of political views** stands in the way of improving U.S.-Cuban relations, experts say. While experts say the United States wants regime change, "the most important objective of the Cuban government is to remain in power at all costs," says Felix Martin, an assistant professor at Florida International University's Cuban Research Institute. Fidel Castro has been an inspiration for Latin American leftists such as Venezuelan President Hugo Chávez and Bolivian President Evo Morales, who have challenged U.S. policy in the region. What are the issues preventing normalization of U.S.-Cuba relations? Experts say these issues include: **Human rights violations.** In March 2003, the Cuban government arrested seventy-five dissidents and journalists, sentencing them to prison terms of up to twenty-eight years on charges of conspiring with the United States to overthrow the state. The Cuban Commission for Human Rights and National Reconciliation, a Havana-based nongovernmental group, reports that the government has in recent years resorted to other tactics besides prison --such as firings from state jobs and intimidation on the street-- to silence opposition figures. A 2005 UN Human Rights Commission vote condemned Cuba's human rights record, but the country was elected to the new UN Human Rights Council in 2006. **Guantanamo Bay**. Cuba indicated after 9/11 that it would not object if the United States brought prisoners to Guantanamo Bay. However, experts such as Sweig say Cuban officials have since seized on the U.S. prison camp--where hundreds of terror suspects have been detained--as a "symbol of solidarity" with the rest of the world against the United States. Although Obama ordered Guantanamo to be closed by January 22, 2010, the facility remains open as of January 2013, and many analysts say it is likely to stay in operation for an extended period. **Cuban exile community**. The Cuban-American community in southern Florida traditionally has heavily influenced U.S. policy with Cuba. Both political parties fear alienating a strong voting bloc in an important swing state in presidential elections.

**No Latin American conflict impact**

**Ghitis, 12 -** an independent commentator on world affairs and a World Politics Review contributing editor (Frida, World Politics Review, “Latin America, the World's Democracy Lab” 7/5,

http://www.worldpoliticsreview.com/articles/12127/world-citizen-latin-america-the-worlds-democracy-lab)

Democracy in Latin America has created a new set of rules for what continue to be fierce political battles. The disputes that triggered armed conflict in the past now tend to spark bitter legislative maneuvers, even thinly disguised coups, punctuated with street protests that sometimes turn violent, but eventually die off. Latin America still contains the ingredients for violent social conflict, but the willingness to experiment within the elusive parameters of democracy has kept armed conflict to a minimum. It has meant that even when the system disappoints, there is always another democratic path to chart, another formula to concoct. To be sure, violence is far from defeated. Central American countries have some of the highest murder rates in the world as a result of drug trafficking. Mexico has seen some 50,000 die in the battle to defeat the narco-gangs. The decades-old insurgency in Colombia is not finished, and street protests occasionally turn deadly throughout the region. But it's a long way from the civil wars and the "dirty wars" that characterized the region in the second half of the 20th century. Then, the routine means of deciding the shape of the political and economic system was by taking up arms and killing those on the other side of the ideological divide. No more.

**Violence is unlikely to escalate to large scale conflict or pose at threat to US security interests**

**Cárdenas, 3-17-11** [Mauricio, senior fellow and director of the Latin America Initiative at the Brookings Institution, was cabinet minister during the Gaviria and Pastrana administrations in Colombia. Think Again Latin America, Foreign Policy, <http://www.foreignpolicy.com/articles/2011/03/17/think_again_latin_america?page=full>]

"Latin America is violent and dangerous." Yes, but not unstable. Latin American countries have among the world's highest rates of crime, murder, and kidnapping. Pockets of abnormal levels of violence have emerged in countries such as Colombia -- and more recently, in Mexico, Central America, and some large cities such as Caracas. With 140,000 homicides in 2010, it is understandable how Latin America got this reputation. Each of the countries in Central America's "Northern Triangle" (Guatemala, Honduras, and El Salvador) had more murders in 2010 than the entire European Union combined. Violence in Latin America is strongly related to poverty and inequality. When combined with the insatiable international appetite for the illegal drugs produced in the region, it's a noxious brew. As strongly argued by a number of prominent regional leaders -- including Brazil's former president, Fernando H. Cardoso, and Colombia's former president, Cesar Gaviria -- a strategy based on demand reduction, rather than supply, is the only way to reduce crime in Latin America. Although some fear the Mexican drug violence could spill over into the southern United States, Latin America poses little to no threat to international peace or stability. The major global security concerns today are the proliferation of nuclear weapons and terrorism. No country in the region is in possession of nuclear weapons -- nor has expressed an interest in having them. Latin American countries, on the whole, do not have much history of engaging in cross-border wars. Despite the recent tensions on the Venezuela-Colombia border, it should be pointed out that Venezuela has never taken part in an international armed conflict. Ethnic and religious conflicts are very uncommon in Latin America. Although the region has not been immune to radical jihadist attacks -- the 1994 attack on a Jewish Community Center in Buenos Aires, for instance -- they have been rare. Terrorist attacks on the civilian population have been limited to a large extent to the FARC organization in Colombia, a tactic which contributed in large part to the organization's loss of popular support.

**No Bio-D impact.**

**Sagoff, 97** - Mark, Senior Research Scholar – Institute for Philosophy and Public policy in School of Public Affairs – U. Maryland, William and Mary Law Review, “INSTITUTE OF BILL OF RIGHTS LAW SYMPOSIUM DEFINING TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE FUTURE OF GOVERNMENT REGULATION: MUDDLE OR MUDDLE THROUGH? TAKINGS JURISPRUDENCE MEETS THE ENDANGERED SPECIES ACT”, 38 Wm and Mary L. Rev. 825, March, L/N

Note – Colin Tudge - Research Fellow at the Centre for Philosophy at the London School of Economics. Frmr Zoological Society of London: Scientific Fellow and tons of other positions. PhD. Read zoology at Cambridge.

Simon Levin = Moffet Professor of Biology, Princeton. 2007 American Institute of Biological Sciences Distinguished Scientist Award 2008 Istituto Veneto di Scienze Lettere ed Arti 2009 Honorary Doctorate of Science, Michigan State University 2010 Eminent Ecologist Award, Ecological Society of America 2010 Margalef Prize in Ecology, etc… PhD

Although one may agree with ecologists such as Ehrlich and Raven that the earth stands on **the brink of** an episode of **massive extinction, it may not follow** from this grim fact **that human** being**s will suffer** as a result. On the contrary, skeptics such as science writer Colin Tudge have challenged biologists to explain **why we need more than a tenth of the 10 to 100 million species that grace the earth**. Noting that "cultivated systems often out-produce wild systems by 100-fold or more," Tudge declared that "the argument that humans need the variety of other species is, when you think about it, a theological one." n343 Tudge observed that "the **elimination of all but a tiny minority** **of our fellow creatures does not affect the material well-being of humans one iota."**n344 This skeptic challenged ecologists to list more than 10,000 species (other than unthreatened microbes) that are essential to ecosystem productivity or functioning. n345 "**The human species could survive just as well if 99.9% of our fellow creatures went extinct,** provided only that we retained the appropriate 0.1% that we need." n346   [\*906]   The monumental Global Biodiversity Assessment ("the Assessment") identified two positions with respect to redundancy of species. "At one extreme is the idea that each species is unique and important, such that its removal or loss will have demonstrable consequences to the functioning of the community or ecosystem." n347 The authors of the Assessment, a panel of eminent ecologists, endorsed this position, saying it is "unlikely that there is much, if any, ecological redundancy in communities over time scales of decades to centuries, the time period over which environmental policy should operate." n348 These eminent ecologists rejected the opposing view, "the notion that species overlap in function to a sufficient degree that removal or loss of a species will be compensated by others, with negligible overall consequences to the community or ecosystem." n349  Other biologists believe, however, that species are so fabulously redundant in the ecological functions they perform that the life-support systems and processes of the planet and ecological processes in general will function perfectly well with fewer of them, certainly fewer than the millions and millions we can expect to remain **even if** **every threatened organism becomes extinct**. n350 Even the kind of sparse and miserable world depicted in the movie Blade Runner could provide a "sustainable" context for the human economy as long as people forgot their aesthetic and moral commitment to the glory and beauty of the natural world. n351 The Assessment makes this point. "Although any ecosystem contains hundreds to thousands of species interacting among themselves and their physical environment, the emerging consensus is that the system is driven by a small number of . . . biotic variables on whose interactions the balance of species are, in a sense, carried along." n352   [\*907]   To make up your mind on the question of the functional redundancy of species, consider an endangered species of bird, plant, or insect and ask how the ecosystem would fare in its absence. The fact that the creature is endangered suggests an answer: it is already in limbo as far as ecosystem processes are concerned. What crucial ecological services does the black-capped vireo, for example, serve? Are any of the species threatened with extinction necessary to the provision of any ecosystem service on which humans depend? If so, which ones are they?  Ecosystems and the species that compose them have changed, dramatically, continually, and totally in virtually every part of the United States. There is little ecological similarity, for example, between New England today and the land where the Pilgrims died. n353 In view of the constant reconfiguration of the biota, **one may wonder why Americans have not suffered more as a result of ecological catastrophes**. The cast of species in nearly every environment changes constantly-local extinction is commonplace in nature-but the crops still grow. Somehow, it seems, property values keep going up on Martha's Vineyard in spite of the tragic disappearance of the heath hen.  One might argue that the sheer number and variety of creatures available to any ecosystem buffers that system against stress. Accordingly, we should be concerned if the "library" of creatures ready, willing, and able to colonize ecosystems gets too small. (Advances in genetic engineering may well permit us to write a large number of additions to that "library.") In the United States as in many other parts of the world, however, **the number of species has been increasing dramatically**, not decreasing, as a result of human activity. This is because the hordes of exotic species coming into ecosystems in the United States far exceed the number of species that are becoming extinct. Indeed, introductions may outnumber extinctions by more than ten to one, so that the United States is becoming more and more species-rich all the time largely as a result of human action. n354 [\*908] Peter Vitousek and colleagues estimate that over 1000 non-native plants grow in California alone; in Hawaii there are 861; in Florida, 1210. n355 In Florida more than 1000 non-native insects, 23 species of mammals, and about 11 exotic birds have established themselves. n356 Anyone who waters a lawn or hoes a garden knows how many weeds desire to grow there, how many birds and bugs visit the yard, and how many fungi, creepy-crawlies, and other odd life forms show forth when it rains. All belong to nature, from wherever they might hail, but not many homeowners would claim that there are too few of them. Now, not all exotic species provide ecosystem services; indeed, some may be disruptive or have no instrumental value. n357 This also may be true, of course, of native species as well, especially because all exotics are native somewhere. Certain exotic species, however, such as Kentucky blue grass, establish an area's sense of identity and place; others, such as the green crabs showing up around Martha's Vineyard, are nuisances. n358 Consider an analogy [\*909] with human migration. Everyone knows that after a generation or two, immigrants to this country are hard to distinguish from everyone else. The vast majority of Americans did not evolve here, as it were, from hominids; most of us "came over" at one time or another. This is true of many of our fellow species as well, and they may fit in here just as well as we do. It is possible to distinguish exotic species from native ones for a period of time, just as we can distinguish immigrants from native-born Americans, but as the centuries roll by, species, like people, fit into the landscape or the society, changing and often enriching it. Shall we have a rule that a species had to come over on the Mayflower, as so many did, to count as "truly" American? Plainly not. When, then, is the cutoff date? Insofar as we are concerned with the absolute numbers of "rivets" holding ecosystems together, extinction seems not to pose a general problem because a far greater number of kinds of mammals, insects, fish, plants, and other creatures thrive on land and in water in America today than in prelapsarian times. n359 The Ecological Society of America has urged managers to maintain biological diversity as a critical component in strengthening ecosystems against disturbance. n360 Yet as Simon Levin observed, "much of the detail about species composition will be irrelevant in terms of influences on ecosystem properties." n361 [\*910] He added: "For net primary productivity, as is likely to be the case for any system property, **biodiversity matters only up to a point**; above a certain level, increasing biodiversity is likely to make **little difference**." n362 What about the use of plants and animals in agriculture? There is no scarcity foreseeable. "Of an estimated 80,000 types of plants [we] know to be edible," a U.S. Department of the Interior document says, "only about 150 are extensively cultivated." n363 About twenty species, not one of which is endangered, provide ninety percent of the food the world takes from plants. n364 Any new food has to take "shelf space" or "market share" from one that is now produced. Corporations also find it difficult to create demand for a new product; for example, people are not inclined to eat paw-paws, even though they are delicious. It is hard enough to get people to eat their broccoli and lima beans. It is harder still to develop consumer demand for new foods. This may be the reason the Kraft Corporation does not prospect in remote places for rare and unusual plants and animals to add to the world's diet. Of the roughly 235,000 flowering plants and 325,000 nonflowering plants (including mosses, lichens, and seaweeds) available, farmers ignore virtually all of them in favor of a very few that are profitable. n365 To be sure, any of the more than 600,000 species of plants could have an application in agriculture, but would they be preferable to the species that are now dominant? Has anyone found any consumer demand for any of these half-million or more plants to replace rice or wheat in the human diet? There are reasons that farmers cultivate rice, wheat, and corn rather than, say, Furbish's lousewort. There are many kinds of louseworts, so named because these weeds were thought to cause lice in sheep. How many does agriculture really require? [\*911] The species on which agriculture relies are domesticated, not naturally occurring; they are developed by artificial not natural selection; they might not be able to survive in the wild. n366 This argument is not intended to deny the religious, aesthetic, cultural, and moral reasons that command us to respect and protect the natural world. These spiritual and ethical values should evoke action, of course, but we should also recognize that they are spiritual and ethical values. We should recognize that ecosystems and all that dwell therein compel our moral respect, our aesthetic appreciation, and our spiritual veneration; we should clearly seek to achieve the goals of the ESA. There is no reason to assume, however, that these goals have anything to do with human well-being or welfare as economists understand that term. These are ethical goals, in other words, not economic ones. Protecting the marsh may be the right thing to do for moral, cultural, and spiritual reasons. We should do it-but someone will have to pay the costs. In the narrow sense of promoting human welfare, protecting nature often represents a net "cost," not a net "benefit." It is largely for moral, not economic, reasons-ethical, not prudential, reasons- that we care about all our fellow creatures. They are valuable as objects of love not as objects of use. What is good for   [\*912]  the marsh may be good in itself even if it is not, in the economic sense, good for mankind. **The most valuable things are quite useless**.

**Plan kills Brazil’s sugar industry.**

**Miami Herald 02** (6/26/02, “Cuba embargo under fire - Sally Grooms Cowal's Group cites benefits for U.S.,” http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/news/706185/posts)//DR. H

4. The next reason in favor of doing away with the embargo runs as follows: Look here, there is money to be made in Cuba. Remember Coolidge’s, the "business of America is business?" If everything else fails, appeal to greed . There are some salivating mouths claiming that 6 billion dollars worth of goods and commodities could be sold to Cuba. But unless the U.S. takes the place of the Soviet Union and initially subsidizes the Cuban economy with credits and loans (coming out of American tax paying pockets), and rebuild its shattered infrastructure at a cost of billions upon billions of dollars, the U.S. would have to buy Cuban sugar produced by workers paid now 10 dollars per month in order to enable Cubans to have money to pay for all these goodies, without any guarantees that the large portion of the profits made would not go first to the apparatus of repression (armed forces, secret police and Communist Party cadres) and to the modernization of its weapons systems and only lastly, to the Cuban people. Moreover, one must ask: what happens to the sugar industry of Florida now producing 25% of the sugar consumed in the U.S.?. Furthermore, according to the American Sugar Alliance, 80-85% of the sugar produced in the U.S. is consumed here. The remainder 15% is imported from 40 foreign countries--about 1,5 million tons. Under WTO and NAFTA rules the U.S. is required to bring in AT LEAST that amount, even if the U.S. does not need it now! Any sale of Cuban sugar to a sugar producing country like the U.S. would mean that there would be less of the market for the American sugar industry to go around.

In addition, **what would happen abroad to Brazil’s sugar market**, one of the largest producers of sugar, (even if a significant amount of that country's sugar is used to produce ethanol)? and to the Dominican Republic’s or Mexico's market? to mention only three sugar producing countries in our hemisphere. We should ponder, in this context, the following statement issued on August 10, 2000 by Joseph Terrell, Director of Public Affairs of the American Sugar Alliance: "We are well aware of the challenges lifting the Cuban embargo could have on the US sugar industry. Also, quota holders in other countries are monitoring the situation closely as well because they could stand to lose…we are monitoring this closely." A similar view has been advanced by the general manager of the Louisiana Sugar Cane Cooperative and secretary/treasurer of the Louisiana Farm Bureau Foundation, Jackie Theriot, who said: **Lifting the embargo -- without holding Cuba to production limits -- would flood the U.S. market with sugar, dropping the prices and bankrupting the domestic industry.** (quoted by Kevin Blanchard in his article "Now no Time to Help Cuba," The Advocate ONLINE (April 11, 2002) However, it is unlikely that Castro's Cuba would accept being hamstrung by production limits and it would go against the free trade ideology espoused by Washington these days.

Is the U.S. going to harden the grip of Castro by granting him even a significantly diminished market opening at the expense of its own sugar industry? Imperil the Brazilian sale of sugar to the U.S. just to please Castro? Is the U.S. going to finance the the conversion of Cuban sugar into ethanol, as means to reduce the worldwide glut of sugar even though the prospects of creating a large U.S. ethanol market is still an economic entelechy? Moreover, consider that during one year, in the decade of the 50’s (1959, for example) Cuba’s sugar quota in the U.S. totaled 1.256 million metric tons, roughly the same amount that the U.S. now imports from 40 countries! It is well known that when Cuba lost its generous American sugar quota in the 60’s this amount was allocated to other countries. which used the allocation to maintain their sugar industry and increase their production. What would be the ripple effect of the Cuban re-intervention in the American sugar market, given that it will be considerably less than what it sold in the 50’s and will offer sugar at a low price to gain a foothold in the market? This macroeconomic assessment has not been addressed in the public arena by Castro’s acolytes and foot soldiers in this country. In addition, in the case Dominican Republic, the European Union subsidized exports have already caused a 20% income loss of income in that country. If Cuba’s sales of sugar take a slice of the American market, both the domestic and international suppliers, such as the Dominican Republic, Brazil, and Mexico (who incidentally, has been encouraged to develop an ethanol industry) are going to feel even more severely impacted. Even if Cuba did not make efforts to create a capital intensive industry, as the cane sugar producers in the U.S and producers of sugar in the world have done it, Cuban sugar would be produced more cheaply, as already indicated, doubtlessly, with Communist government subsidies in order to retain a share of the American market.

**That causes Brazilian economic instability.**

**SC 12** (Sugarcane.org, AT: Website’s Bias!!! – Cites objective data…, 6/19/12, “Impact on Brazil's Economy,” http://sugarcane.org/the-brazilian-experience/impact-on-brazils-economy)//DR. H

The sugarcane industry – including cultivation, processing and refined products – represents an important segment of the Brazilian economy.

Economic Contribution

In 2010, the sugarcane sector contributes US$50 billion to Brazil’s gross domestic product (GDP) – equivalent to almost 2.4% of the entire Brazilian economy and comparable to the GDP of a European country like Slovenia (US$47.7 billion).

When you add in the various suppliers and stakeholders who depend on Brazil’s sugarcane industry, the entire sugarcane agro-industrial system generates gross revenues totaling more than US$86 billion annually.

Good Jobs

The sugarcane industry employs 1.28 million workers, according to 2008 data from the Ministry of Labor and Employment’s Annual Report of Social Information (RAIS).

**Nuclear war.**

**Shulz 2k** (Donald, Research Professor of National Security Policy at the Strategic Studies Institute of the U.S. Army War College THE UNITED STATES AND LATIN AMERICA: SHAPING AN ELUSIVE FUTURE, March)

While we are in a speculative mode, it may be useful to raise the issue of whether, two or three decades from now, the United States might have to deal with a regional hegemon or peer competitor. The most obvious candidate for such a role would be Brazil, which already accounts for almost half of Latin America’s economic production and has by far the largest armed forces in the region (313,250 active troops).53 That country could very well assume a more commanding political and military role in the decades ahead. Until recently, the primary U.S. concern about Brazil has been that it might acquire nuclear weapons and delivery systems. In the 1970s, the Brazilian military embarked on a secret program to develop an atom bomb. By the late 1980s, both Brazil and Argentina were aggressively pursuing nuclear development programs that had clear military spin-offs.54 There were powerful military and civilian advocates of developing nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles within both countries. Today, however, the situation has changed. As a result of political leadership transitions in both countries, Brazil and Argentina now appear firmly committed to restricting their nuclear programs to peaceful purposes. They have entered into various nuclear-related agreements with each other—most notably the quadripartite comprehensive safeguards agreement (1991), which permits the inspection of all their nuclear installations by the International Atomic Energy Agency—and have joined the Missile Technology Control Regime. Even so, no one can be certain about the future. As Scott Tollefson has observed: . . . the military application of Brazil’s nuclear and space programs depends less on technological considerations than on political will. While technological constraints present a formidable barrier to achieving nuclear bombs and ballistic missiles, that barrier is not insurmountable. The critical element, therefore, in determining the applications of Brazil’s nuclear and space technologies will be primarily political.55 Put simply, if changes in political leadership were instrumental in redirecting Brazil’s nuclear program towards peaceful purposes, future political upheavals could still produce a reversion to previous orientations. Civilian supremacy is not so strong that it could not be swept away by a coup, especially if the legitimacy of the current democratic experiment were to be undermined by economic crisis and growing poverty/inequality. Nor are civilian leaders necessarily less militaristic or more committed to democracy than the military. The example of Peru’s Fujimori comes immediately to mind. How serious a threat might Brazil potentially be? It has been estimated that if the nuclear plant at Angra dos Reis (Angra I) were only producing at 30 percent capacity, it could produce five 20-kiloton weapons a year. If production from other plants were included, Brazil would have a capability three times greater than India or Pakistan. Furthermore, its defense industry already has a substantial missile producing capability. On the other hand, the country has a very limited capacity to project its military power via air and sealift or to sustain its forces over long distances. And though a 1983 law authorizes significant military manpower increases (which could place Brazil at a numerical level slightly higher than France, Iran and Pakistan), such growth will be restricted by a lack of economic resources. Indeed, the development of all these military potentials has been, and will continue to be, severely constrained by a lack of money. (Which is one reason Brazil decided to engage in arms control with Argentina in the first place.) 56 In short, a restoration of Brazilian militarism, imbued with nationalistic ambitions for great power status, is not unthinkable, and such a regime could present some fairly serious problems. That government would probably need foreign as well as domestic enemies to help justify its existence. One obvious candidate would be the United States, which would presumably be critical of any return to dictatorial rule. Beyond this, moreover, the spectre of a predatory international community, covetous of the riches of the Amazon, could help rally political support to the regime. For years, some Brazilian military officers have been warning of “foreign intervention.” Indeed, as far back as 1991 General Antenor de Santa Cruz Abreu, then chief of the Military Command of the Amazon, threatened to transform the region into a “new Vietnam” if developed countries tried to “internationalize” the Amazon. Subsequently, in 1993, U.S.-Guyanese combined military exercises near the Brazilian border provoked an angry response from many high-ranking Brazilian officers. 57 Since then, of course, U.S.-Brazilian relations have improved considerably. Nevertheless, the basic U.S./ international concerns over the Amazon—the threat to the region’s ecology through burning and deforestation, the presence of narcotrafficking activities, the Indian question, etc.—have not disappeared, and some may very well intensify in the years ahead. At the same time, if the growing trend towards subregional economic groupings—in particular, MERCOSUR—continues, it is likely to increase competition between Southern Cone and NAFTA countries. Economic conflicts, in turn, may be expected to intensify political differences, and could lead to heightened politico-military rivalry between different blocs or coalitions in the hemisphere. Even so, there continue to be traditional rivalries and conflicts within MERCOSUR, especially between Brazil and its neighbors, and these will certainly complicate the group’s evolution. Among other things, the past year witnessed a serious deterioration of relations between Brazil and Argentina, the product partly of the former’s January 1999 currency devaluation, which severely strained economic ties between the two countries. In part, too, these conflicts were aggravated by Argentina’s (unsuccessful) bid to join the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), which Brazilians interpreted as an attempt to gain strategic advantage. The upshot was that relations soured to the extent where questions have been raised as to the continued viability of MERCOSUR itself. In light of these problems, one cannot but wonder what impact a resurgence of Brazilian authoritarianism, combined with a push for regional hegemonic status, would have on Argentina, currently a “non-NATO ally” of the United States.

**Not enough sugar and Castro says no**

**Sanchez ‘11**

Adriana E. Sanchez, NotiEn, News Agency, 2011, “Biofuels Fighting for Space in Central America and Cuba,” http://repository.unm.edu/bitstream/handle/1928/12797/Biofuels%20Fighting%20for%20Space%20in%20Central%20America%20and%20Cuba.pdf?sequence=1

Similar to Central America, Cuba’s potential to become a leader in biofuel production is subject to speculation, and it will be strongly tied to the energy policy that the island adopts within the next few years. The Association for the Study of Cuban Economy (ASCE) says sugarcane could seemingly provide the raw material for biofuel production. But tight supplies might be a problem. The island nation is expected to produce only 1.2 million tons of raw sugar. This is a very small amount when compared to sugar production in the 1990s, which was estimated to reach 7 million to 8 million tons per year. With its current sugarcane output, Cuba could produce an estimated 3.2 billion gallons of ethanol per year, energy industry sources say. ¶ In an interview with NotiEn, Jorge Piñón, a well-known expert on Cuban energy policy, suggested that Cuba would have to stop its dependence on fossil fuels from foreign countries if it is to develop energy independence. "Cuba passed from papa Russia to papa Venezuela to solve its population’s energy demand," said Piñón. "Cuba must strive to start working on an energy policy that can help the country independent of who is in power." ¶ Piñón said ethanol production has not been more actively promoted because of the complicated relation that Cuba has had with sugarcane. "Fidel Castro puts his foot down every time there are talks about an increase in ethanol production; for him it is a political issue," said Piñón, a visiting research fellow at the Cuban Research Institute at Florida International University’s Latin American and Caribbean Center and an analyst for the Center for Hemispheric Policy at the University of Miami.

**Imported Cuban biofuel trades off with corn ethanol production in the US**

**Specht 4/24** (Jonathan Specht, BA from University of California Davis, 4/24/13, “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States”, http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf)

Unless Congress raises the RFS by a sufficient degree to absorb all domestic ethanol production on top of these new imports, the increase in such imports would likely damage the domestic ethanol industry. “Whatever the level or type of biofuel, increased imports (holding other factors constant) would reduce the quantity of domestically produced biofuels, which would reduce the demand for biofuel feedstocks.”138 Because very little ethanol is currently imported into the United States, law and policy changes that successfully fostered the development of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry would have a significant economic impact on the United States. Such a change would have the largest economic effect on two regions: the Midwest, which is currently the primary source of ethanol production in the United States, and the Southeast, especially Florida. This Part of the Article will discuss the likely economic effects of such policy changes first on the Midwest, then on Florida, then on the United States generally.

**No warming impacts.**

**Burnett, 12** – Sterling, Ph.D., Senior Fellow in Environment and Energy at the National Center for Policy Analysis (NCPA), “Fraud and Heartland: A Scandal for Climate Alarmists, not Skeptics,” 2-22, http://environmentblog.ncpa.org/fraud-and-heartland-a-scandal-for-climate-alarmists-not-skeptics/.

Sadly (for him), Peter Gleick, the researcher at issue, could have obtained a good deal of the information he sought through a request for Heartland’s 990, a tax document that non-profits have to provide to any who request it. Rather than going through legitimate channels to obtain what information he could or, better still, questioning the veracity of the initial document he received — and there were many reasons to question that document, among them the fact that it was delivered to him anonymously — using someone else’s name, a Heartland board member — he requested internal documents. Despite all the sound and fury surrounding this episode over the last week, really, nothing new was learned in the memos. As Time Magazine summed it up: “The alleged memos seem to confirm that the Heartland Institute is trying to push it’s highly skeptical view of climate science into the public sphere, which is only surprising if you’ve paid exactly zero attention to the climate debate over the past decade.” Gleick admits that his actions were wrong and apologized but said he did it out of “frustration.” One has to ask, frustration over what? Is he perhaps frustrated with the fact that he and his fellow climate alarmists have, as of yet, been unable to convince Americans that the scientific case for climate action is settled and stampede them into calling for policies that forcibly restrict energy use? Daily polls show more American’s are coming to doubt the argument that human actions are causing a warming that would result in catastrophic climate change. Or perhaps he is frustrated with the fact that an increasing number of scientists – scientists with **as good or better credentials** and reputations as those who argue that humans are causing warming — continue to highlight the weakness, discrepancies and contradictions that continue to plague global warming theory and demonstrate that the case in far from closed. Perhaps Glieck and his ilk are frustrated because they constantly bray that scientists and think tanks that show skepticism concerning one or another critical point of global warming theory are exceedingly well-funded; when the reality is, and Gleick knows it, these scientists and think tanks are **very modestly funded** when compared to the billions that are spent to on climate research, politics and on politically favored technologies by governments, billionaires and corporations who will benefit from climate policies, and the non-profit foundations and think tanks that want to use fear of global warming to reshape the Western economic system into what they believe would be a more humane, equitable (socialist), global version of society. A society where international bodies, with bureaucracies staffed by “experts” beyond the reach of crass democratic politics and mass opinion will steer the ship of global-state in the direction of the “true” public good. Time magazine notes that if anything, the Heartland memos debunk the idea of a well-funded “. . . vast right-wing conspiracy,” behind global warming skepticism. Who says the Progressive era has passed?

**No food wars, and they don’t escalate.**

**Salehyan 08** (Idean, Prof. Pol. Sci. @ North Texas, Journal of Peace Research, “From Climate Change to Conflict? No Consensus Yet”, 45:3, Sage, DOI: 10.1177/0022343308088812)

A few caveats are in order here. It is important to note, again, that the most severe effects of climate change are likely to be felt in the future, and the future is inherently uncertain.4 While fundamental shifts in the environment are not inconceivable, our best bet for predicting what is to come is to look at what has transpired in the past. Since it is frequently argued that climate change will lead to resource scarcities and exacerbate inequality, it is possible to draw upon past evidence regarding these factors to develop a sense of how conflicts might unfold given changes in the Earth’s atmosphere. Additionally, I do not take issue with the claim that climate change will present considerable challenges for human societies and ecosystems more generally. Humanitarian crises stemming, in part, from climate change have the potential to be severe, and steps must be taken quickly to attenuate such contingencies. Rather, my purpose here is to underscore the point that environmental processes, by themselves, cannot explain why, where, and when fighting will occur; rather, the interaction between environmental and political systems is critical for understanding organized armed violence. First, the deterministic view has poor predictive power as to where and when conflicts will break out. For every potential example of an environmental catastrophe or resource shortfall that leads to violence, there are many more counter-examples in which conflict never occurs. But popular accounts typically do not look at the dogs that do not bark. Darfur is frequently cited as a case where desertification led to food scarcity, water scarcity, and famine, in turn leading to civil war and ethnic cleansing.5 Yet, food scarcity and hunger are problems endemic to many countries – particularly in sub-Saharan Africa – but similar problems elsewhere have not led to large-scale violence. According to the Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, food shortages and malnutrition affect more than a third of the population in Malawi, Zambia, the Comoros, North Korea, and Tanzania,6 although none of these countries have experienced fullblown civil war and state failure. Hurricanes, coastal flooding, and droughts – which are all likely to intensify as the climate warms – are frequent occurrences which rarely lead to violence. The Asian Tsunami of 2004, although caused by an oceanic earthquake, led to severe loss of life and property, flooding, population displacement, and resource scarcity, but it did not trigger new wars in Southeast Asia. Large-scale migration has the potential to provoke conflict in receiving areas (see Reuveny, 2007; Salehyan & Gleditsch, 2006), yet most migration flows do not lead to conflict, and, in this regard, social integration and citizenship policies are particularly important (Gleditsch, Nordås & Salehyan, 2007). In short, resource scarcity, natural disasters, and long-term climatic shifts are ubiquitous, while armed conflict is rare; therefore, environmental conditions, by themselves, cannot predict violent outbreaks. Second, even if local skirmishes over access to resources arise, these do not always escalate to open warfare and state collapse. While interpersonal violence is more or less common and may intensify under resource pressures, sustained armed conflict on a massive scale is difficult to conduct. Meier, Bond & Bond (2007) show that, under certain circumstances, environmental conditions have led to cattle raiding among pastoralists in East Africa, but these conflicts rarely escalate to sustained violence. Martin (2005) presents evidence from Ethiopia that, while a large refugee influx and population pressures led to localized conflict over natural resources, effective resource management regimes were able to ameliorate these tensions. Both of these studies emphasize the role of local dispute-resolution regimes and institutions – not just the response of central governments – in preventing resource conflicts from spinning out of control. Martin’s analysis also points to the importance of international organizations, notably the UN High Commissioner for Refugees, in implementing effective policies governing refugee camps. Therefore, local hostilities need not escalate to serious armed conflict and can be managed if there is the political will to do so.

**No risk of nuclear terror.**

**Chapman 12** (Stephen, editorial writer for Chicago Tribune, “CHAPMAN: Nuclear terrorism unlikely,” May 22, http://www.oaoa.com/articles/chapman-87719-nuclear-terrorism.html)

A layperson may figure it’s only a matter of time before the unimaginable comes to pass. Harvard’s Graham Allison, in his book “Nuclear Terrorism,” concludes, “On the current course, nuclear terrorism is inevitable.” But remember: After Sept. 11, 2001, we all thought more attacks were a certainty. Yet al-Qaida and its ideological kin have proved unable to mount a second strike. Given their inability to do something simple — say, shoot up a shopping mall or set off a truck bomb — it’s reasonable to ask whether they have a chance at something much more ambitious. Far from being plausible, argued Ohio State University professor John Mueller in a presentation at the University of Chicago, “the likelihood that a terrorist group will come up with an atomic bomb seems to be vanishingly small.” The events required to make that happen comprise a multitude of Herculean tasks. First, a terrorist group has to get a bomb or fissile material, perhaps from Russia’s inventory of decommissioned warheads. If that were easy, one would have already gone missing. Besides, those devices are probably no longer a danger, since weapons that are not maintained quickly become what one expert calls “radioactive scrap metal.” If terrorists were able to steal a Pakistani bomb, they would still have to defeat the arming codes and other safeguards designed to prevent unauthorized use. As for Iran, no nuclear state has ever given a bomb to an ally — for reasons even the Iranians can grasp. Stealing some 100 pounds of bomb fuel would require help from rogue individuals inside some government who are prepared to jeopardize their own lives. Then comes the task of building a bomb. It’s not something you can gin up with spare parts and power tools in your garage. It requires millions of dollars, a safe haven and advanced equipment — plus people with specialized skills, lots of time and a willingness to die for the cause. Assuming the jihadists vault over those Himalayas, they would have to deliver the weapon onto American soil. Sure, drug smugglers bring in contraband all the time — but seeking their help would confront the plotters with possible exposure or extortion. This, like every other step in the entire process, means expanding the circle of people who know what’s going on, multiplying the chance someone will blab, back out or screw up. That has heartening implications. If al-Qaida embarks on the project, it has only a minuscule chance of seeing it bear fruit. Given the formidable odds, it probably won’t bother. None of this means we should stop trying to minimize the risk by securing nuclear stockpiles, monitoring terrorist communications and improving port screening. But it offers good reason to think that in this war, it appears, the worst eventuality is one that will never happen.

#### Prolif will be slow.

**Tepperman 09 –** [Jonathan, Newsweek International's first Assistant Managing Editor (now Deputy Editor), “Why Obama Should Learn to Love the Bomb” 8-29, http://www.newsweek.com/2009/08/28/why-obama-should-learn-to-love-the-bomb.html, SM]

The risk of an arms race—with, say, other Persian Gulf states rushing to build a bomb after Iran got one—is a bit harder to dispel. Once again, however, history is instructive. "In 64 years, the most nuclear-weapons states we've ever had is 12," says Waltz. "Now with North Korea we're at nine. That's not proliferation; that's spread at glacial pace." Nuclear weapons are so controversial and expensive that only countries that deem them absolutely critical to their survival go through the extreme trouble of acquiring them. That's why South Africa, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan voluntarily gave theirs up in the early '90s, and why other countries like Brazil and Argentina dropped nascent programs. This doesn't guarantee that one or more of Iran's neighbors—Egypt or Saudi Arabia, say—might not still go for the bomb if Iran manages to build one. But the risks of a rapid spread are low, especially given Secretary of State Hillary Clinton's recent suggestion that the United States would extend a nuclear umbrella over the region, as Washington has over South Korea and Japan, if Iran does complete a bomb. If one or two Gulf states nonetheless decided to pursue their own weapon, that still might not be so disastrous

# Block

**Gradual transition now---political liberalization is facilitating an economic “soft landing”---solves the Aff**

**Piccone, 10/3** – Acting Vice President and Director of Foreign Policy at the Brookings Institute (Ted, “Cuba’s Stroll Toward Change: A View from the Streets”, Brookings Institute, 10/3/13, http://www.brookings.edu/research/reports/2013/10/03-cuba-trip-piccone)//SJF

We are witnessing today the unfolding of a transitional hybrid economy that has one foot on the accelerator and one foot on the brake. On one hand, a host of ongoing reforms in the domains of agriculture, tourism, property transfers, travel abroad and even sports are unshackling Cubans from a predominant state. President Obama’s decision in 2009 to relax U.S. travel and remittances rules has also helped give oxygen to the more liberal features of the reforms by providing seed money for new businesses and facilitating the flow of goods and capital from the Cuban diaspora in Florida. On the other hand, implementation of reforms is slow and often limited to pilot projects dispersed throughout the island. Rules for foreign investment are too restrictive and arbitrarily enforced and property rights remain in doubt.

Nonetheless, the package of changes underway in Cuba, under the auspices of Raúl Castro and other heroes of the Revolution, lends a certain political legitimacy to the project that could facilitate a soft landing for such a hard situation. As Richard Feinberg argues in a new Brookings report on the emerging middle classes due out this November, such a soft landing is already underway as small and medium enterprises and cooperatives gain traction. Castro’s announcement last year that his current five-year term will be his last, and the appointment of a much younger vice president to guide the party to the next phase of “prosperous socialism,” give Cubans I spoke to some hope that, in the next five years, Cuba will look even more different than it did five years ago.

This shift is already visible. Open debates among Cuban citizens, including one I attended on the national budget process in a well-appointed theater organized by a leading public affairs magazine, are slowly underway. The Catholic Church is also playing an interesting role. The Conference of Catholic Bishops in Cuba recently released its first pastoral letter in 20 years endorsing the government’s economic liberalization and calling for a political opening that respects “the right to diversity with respect to thoughts, to creativity and to the search for truth.” Outspoken activists are touring European, Latin American and North American cities with their critiques of the current system and returning to the island determined to continue their campaign for greater freedoms, despite continued harassment and detentions. Change is in the tropical air.

As Cuba opens its economy to the world, and gradually finds the confidence to let Cubans be more open at home as well, the United States would be smart to move beyond the confines of its Cold War policy and let Americans see what they can do to support the Cuban people. President Obama can start by expanding the steps he took in his first term to facilitate greater trade, travel and communications with the Cuban people and budding small enterprises. He can also credibly remove Cuba from the list of state sponsors of terrorism, which is severely hampering a whole host of basic financial transactions for legitimate American travelers and businesses alike. It is time to exploit the opportunity offered by Cuba’s economic reforms and let reconciliation – both within the island and across the Florida Straits – begin.

**Cuba has no preparation for change and wouldn’t be able to take it all at once---lifting the embargo would cause a rapid democratic uprising**

**Erikson, 8** – Senior Advisor for Western Hemisphere Affairs at the U.S. Department of State and has an M.A. in Public Policy from Harvard University and a B.A. from Brown University (Daniel P., “The Cuba Wars: Fidel Castro, the United States, and the Next Revolution”, Bloomsbury Press, 10/28/08, p. 250-251)//EX

Like most of his colleagues, Monreal readily agreed that the United States was the unpredictable eight-hundred pound gorilla with the potential to transform Cuba’s future: “Lifting the embargo would be **totally disruptive for Cuba**. I don’t know if the impact would be good or bad,” he told me. “You know it’s a mistake to believe that the Cuban government would have the ability and the manpower to manage or control the events that would follow. That is false. Because if the embargo were lifted, it would have **such a huge, rapid impact** that Cuba – at least the Cuba I know – would not be prepared for the changes it would bring. If you imagine that this is a boxing match, then right now the Cuban boxer is in the United States, but he knows the other guy’s moves and how to protect himself. But what if, all at once, the boxer is put in the ring against fifteen other guys? You’d have the ring crying! And for better or worse, the ability of the Cuban government to control this fight is very limited.”

**Gorrell, 5 -** Lieutenant Colonel, US Army, paper submitted for the USAWC STRATEGY RESEARCH PROJECT (Tim, “CUBA: THE NEXT UNANTICIPATED ANTICIPATED STRATEGIC CRISIS?” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA433074>)

Regardless of the succession, under the current U.S. policy, Cuba’s problems of a post Castro transformation only worsen. In addition to Cubans on the island, there will be those in exile who will return claiming authority. And there are remnants of the dissident community within Cuba who will attempt to exercise similar authority. A power vacuum or absence of order will create the conditions for instability and civil war. Whether Raul or another successor from within the current government can hold power is debatable. However, that individual will nonetheless extend the current policies for an indefinite period, which will only compound the Cuban situation. When Cuba finally collapses anarchy is a strong possibility if the U.S. maintains the “wait and see” approach. The U.S. then must deal with an unstable country 90 miles off its coast. In the midst of this chaos, thousands will flee the island. During the Mariel boatlift in 1980 125,000 fled the island.26 Many were criminals; this time the number could be several hundred thousand fleeing to the U.S., creating a refugee crisis. Equally important, by adhering to a negative containment policy, the U.S. may be creating its next series of transnational criminal problems. Cuba is along the axis of the drug-trafficking flow into the U.S. from Columbia. The Castro government as a matter of policy does not support the drug trade. In fact, Cuba’s actions have shown that its stance on drugs is more than hollow rhetoric as indicated by its increasing seizure of drugs – 7.5 tons in 1995, 8.8 tons in 1999, and 13 tons in 2000.27 While there may be individuals within the government and outside who engage in drug trafficking and a percentage of drugs entering the U.S. may pass through Cuba, the Cuban government is not the path of least resistance for the flow of drugs. If there were no Cuban restraints, the flow of drugs to the U.S. could be greatly facilitated by a Cuba base of operation and accelerate considerably. In the midst of an unstable Cuba, the opportunity for radical fundamentalist groups to operate in the region increases. If these groups can export terrorist activity from Cuba to the U.S. or throughout the hemisphere then the war against this extremism gets more complicated. Such activity could increase direct attacks and disrupt the economies, threatening the stability of the fragile democracies that are budding throughout the region. In light of a failed state in the region, the U.S. may be forced to deploy military forces to Cuba, creating the conditions for another insurgency. The ramifications of this action could very well fuel greater anti-American sentiment throughout the Americas. A proactive policy now can mitigate these potential future problems. U.S. domestic political support is also turning against the current negative policy. The Cuban American population in the U.S. totals 1,241,685 or 3.5% of the population.28 Most of these exiles reside in Florida; their influence has been a factor in determining the margin of victory in the past two presidential elections. But this election strategy may be flawed, because recent polls of Cuban Americans reflect a decline for President Bush based on his policy crackdown. There is a clear softening in the Cuban-American community with regard to sanctions. Younger Cuban Americans do not necessarily subscribe to the hard-line approach. These changes signal an opportunity for a new approach to U.S.-Cuban relations. (Table 1) The time has come to look realistically at the Cuban issue. Castro will rule until he dies. The only issue is what happens then? The U.S. can little afford to be distracted by a failed state 90 miles off its coast. The administration, given the present state of world affairs, does not have the luxury or the resources to pursue the traditional American model of crisis management. The President and other government and military leaders have warned that the GWOT will be long and protracted. These warnings were sounded when the administration did not anticipate operations in Iraq consuming so many military, diplomatic and economic resources. There is justifiable concern that Africa and the Caucasus region are potential hot spots for terrorist activity, so these areas should be secure. North Korea will continue to be an unpredictable crisis in waiting. We also cannot ignore China. What if China resorts to aggression to resolve the Taiwan situation? Will the U.S. go to war over Taiwan? Additionally, Iran could conceivably be the next target for U.S. pre-emptive action. These are known and potential situations that could easily require all or many of the elements of national power to resolve. In view of such global issues, can the U.S. afford to sustain the status quo and simply let the Cuban situation play out? The U.S. is at a crossroads: should the policies of the past 40 years remain in effect with vigor? Or should the U.S. pursue a new approach to Cuba in an effort to facilitate a manageable transition to post-Castro Cuba?

**Rapprochement coming now, but it’s slow and fragile – the Aff crushes diplomatic momentum**

**AP, 6/21** (Associated Press, “Cuba, U.S. try talking, but face many obstacles”, Naples News, 6/21/13, http://www.naplesnews.com/news/2013/jun/21/cuba-us-try-talking-face-many-obstacles/)//SJF

They've hardly become allies, but Cuba and the U.S. have taken some baby steps toward rapprochement in recent weeks that have people on this island and in Washington wondering if a **breakthrough in relations** could be **just over the horizon.**

Skeptics caution that the Cold War enemies have been here many times before, only to fall back into old recriminations. But there are signs that views might be shifting on both sides of the Florida Straits.

In the past week, the two countries have held talks on resuming direct mail service, and announced a July 17 sit-down on migration issues. In May, a U.S. federal judge allowed a convicted Cuban intelligence agent to return to the island. This month, Cuba informed the family of jailed U.S. government subcontractor Alan Gross that it would let an American doctor examine him, though the visit has apparently not yet happened. Castro has also ushered in a series of economic and social changes, including making it easier for Cubans to travel off the island.

**Under the radar,** diplomats on both sides describe a sea change in the tone of their dealings.

Only last year, Cuban state television was broadcasting grainy footage of American diplomats meeting with dissidents on Havana streets and publically accusing them of being CIA front-men. Today, U.S. diplomats in Havana and Cuban Foreign Ministry officials have easy contact, even sharing home phone numbers.

Josefina Vidal, Cuba's top diplomat for North American affairs, recently traveled to Washington and met twice with State Department officials — a visit that came right before the announcements of resumptions in the two sets of bilateral talks that had been suspended for more than two years. Washington has also granted visas to prominent Cuban officials, including the daughter of Cuba's president.

"These recent steps indicate a desire on both sides to try to move forward, but also a recognition on both sides of just how difficult it is to make real progress," said Robert Pastor, a professor of international relations at American University and former national security adviser on Latin America during the Carter administration. "These are tiny, **incremental** gains, and the prospects of going backwards are equally high."

Among the things that have changed, John Kerry has taken over as U.S. secretary of state after being an outspoken critic of Washington's policy on Cuba while in the Senate. President Barack Obama no longer has re-election concerns while dealing with the Cuban-American electorate in Florida, where there are also indications of a warming attitude to negotiating with Cuba.

Cuban President Raul Castro, meanwhile, is striving to overhaul the island's Marxist economy with a dose of limited free-market capitalism and may feel a need for more open relations with the U.S. While direct American investment is still barred on the island, a rise in visits and money transfers by Cuban-Americans since Obama relaxed restrictions has been a boon for Cuba's cash-starved economy. **Under the table**, Cuban-Americans are also helping relatives on the island start private businesses and refurbish homes bought under Castro's limited free-market reforms.

Several prominent Cuban dissidents have been allowed to travel recently due to Castro's changes. The trips have been applauded by Washington, and also may have lessened Havana's worries about the threat posed by dissidents.

Likewise, a U.S. federal judge's decision to allow Cuban spy Rene Gonzalez to return home was met with only muted criticism inside the United States, perhaps emboldening U.S. diplomats to seek further openings with Cuba.

**The Cuban government can’t control the outcome---lack of scapegoat causes disruptive uprising**

**Koenig, 10** – US Army Colonel, paper submitted for a Masters in Strategic Studies at the US Army War College (Lance, “Time for a New Cuba Policy” <http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA518130>)

The United States needs to take the initiative away from the Castro regime, and have them react to actions they have publicly called for (removal of the embargo), but in reality are unsure of the second and third order effects and their ability to control the outcome. One of the first problems for the Cuban government after the removal of the embargo will be the excuse for the poor performing economy. “… the embargo and the United States policy of confrontation and isolation have been incredibly useful to the Cuban regime as an alibi for the failures of the regime to meet the fundamental needs of the people on the island, but also is a significant source of legitimacy, both internal and external.” 41 This situation may present the United States with the opportunity to step in to assist with market reforms if the Cuban economy sputters and the government realizes they don’t have a scapegoat.

**Obama is pursuing hard-line policies now – reject their evidence – its partisan nonsense**

\*Obama has massive credibility now – his hardline policies are off the roof – he escalated the war in Afghanistan, led efforts to impose harsher economic sanctions on Iran, adopted a hostile stance regarding China’s ambitious territorial claims and became the godfather of NATO’s military campaign – your evidence is bizarre cherry picking and partisan nonsense

**Mataconis 12** – B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University and J.D. from George Mason University School of Law (Doug, and#34;The GOP’s Ridiculous Appeasement Argumentand#34;, January 3 of 2012, <http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/the-gops-ridiculous-appeasement-argument/>) // CB

This isn’t really entirely new, of course. For three years now, Republicans have been accusing the President of “apologizing for America,” even though it’s a manifestly **untrue assertion**. More recently, many on the right have engaged in the ridiculous task of accusing the President of abandoning Hosni Mubarak last February during the height of the protests in Tahrir Square, thus “losing” Egypt. Much of it is **partisan nonsense**, of course, but the idea has become such an article of faith among conservatives that it’s pretty clear that people have a hard time differentiating between facts and partisan rhetoric.

As Ted Galen Carpenter notes in a piece that appeared last week, though, the **facts** simply don’t support the argument that Republicans are making:

The appeasement allegations directed against Obama, though, **border on bizarre**. And the president fired back at his opponents, suggesting that they ask Osama **Bin Laden** and the **twenty-two other high-level al-Qaeda operatives** who have been killed since Obama took office whether he is an appeaser. Fox News host Sean Hannity immediately sneered that Obama merely cited “his one foreign policy success.” By success, Hannity implicitly meant an uncompromising, **hard-line policy**.

But even by that dubious standard, the Republican appeasement charge is **misguided**. The current bastardized definition of appeasement implies a weak-kneed willingness to make far-reaching, unwise concessions to aggressors. That **certainly** does not describe the current occupant of the Oval Office. After all, Obama sharply **escalated the war** in Afghanistan, has led efforts to impose **harsher economic sanctions on Iran**, adopted a **hostile stance** regarding China’s ambitious territorial claims in the South China Sea and served as the **godfather of NATO’s military campaign** to overthrow Muammar Gaddafi. That’s not exactly a record reminiscent of Neville Chamberlain.

**Obama’s hardcore**

**Mataconis 12** – B.A. in Political Science from Rutgers University and J.D. from George Mason University School of Law, (Doug, January 3, 2012, “The GOP’s Ridiculous Appeasement Argument, [http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/the-gops-ridiculous-appeasement-argument/)//HH](http://www.outsidethebeltway.com/the-gops-ridiculous-appeasement-argument/%29//HH)

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**Emboldens Cuba**

**Brookes 09,** Senior Fellow in National Security Affairs at the Heritage Foundation, 09,

(Peter, 4/16/2009, The Heritage Foundation, “Keep the Embargo, O”, http://www .heritage.org/research/commentary/2009/04/keep-the-embargo-o, 6/28/2013) GM.

In the end, though, it's still Fidel Castro and his brother Raul who'll decide whether there'll be a thaw in ties with the United States -- or not.¶ And in usual Castro-style, Fidel himself stood defiant in response to the White House proclamation, barely recognizing the US policy shift.¶ Instead, and predictably, Fidel demanded an end to el bloqueo (the blockade) -- without any promises of change for the people who labor under the regime's hard-line policies.¶ So much for the theory that if we're nice to them, they'll be nice to us.¶ Many are concerned that the lack of love from Havana will lead Washington to make even more unilateral concessions to create an opening with Fidel and the gang.¶ Of course, the big empanada is the US economic embargo against Cuba, in place since 1962, which undoubtedly is the thing Havana most wants done away with -- without any concessions on Cuba's part, of course.¶ Lifting the embargo won't normalize relations, but instead legitimize -- and wave the white flag to -- Fidel's 50-year fight against the Yanquis, further lionizing the dictator and encouraging the Latin American Left.¶ Because the economy is nationalized, trade will pour plenty of cash into the Cuban national coffers -- allowing Havana to suppress dissent at home and bolster its communist agenda abroad.¶ The last thing we should do is to fill the pockets of a regime that'll use those profits to keep a jackboot on the neck of the Cuban people. The political and human-rights situation in Cuba is grim enough already. The police state controls the lives of 11 million Cubans in what has become an island prison. The people enjoy none of the basic civil liberties -- no freedom of speech, press, assembly or association.¶ Security types monitor foreign journalists, restrict Internet access and foreign news and censor the domestic media. The regime holds more than 200 political dissidents in jails that rats won't live in.¶ We also don't need a pumped-up Cuba that could become a serious menace to US interests in Latin America, the Caribbean -- or beyond. (The likes of China, Russia and Iran might also look to partner with a revitalized Cuba.)

**Plan doesn’t help Latin American relations—they secretly like the embargo**

**Suchlicki 2k** (JAIME SUCHLICKI is Emilio Bacardi Moreau Professor of History and International Studies and the Director of the Institute for Cuban and Cuban-American Studies at the University of Miami. He was the founding Executive Director of the North-South Center. For the past decade he was also the editor of the prestigious Journal of Interamerican Studies and World Affairs. He is currently the Latin American Editor for Transaction Publishers and the author of Cuba: From Columbus to Castro (1997), now in its fourth edition, and editor with Irving L. Horowitz of Cuban Communism (1999). He is also the author of Mexico: From Montezuma to NAFTA (1998). He is a highly regarded consultant to both the private and public sector on Cuba and Latin American affairs. The U.S. Embargo of Cuba Jaime Suchlicki University of Miami June 2000 <http://www6.miami.edu/iccas/USEmbargo.pdf>, nkj) Note: The first line of the card is saying an aff argument and then refuting it.

If we lift the Embargo, U.S.-Latin American relations will improve.

Cuba is not an important issue in U.S.-Latin American relations. The U.S.-Latin American agenda includes as priority items trade, investment, transfer of technology, migration, drugs, environment, and intellectual property rights. Cuba is not a priority item on this agenda. While publicly many Latin American countries oppose the embargo, privately they are extremely concerned that Cuba will divert investments from their countries to the island, and particularly that tourism will flock to Cuba, to the detriment of the Caribbean economies.

**Ending sanctions doesn’t solve relations**

**Hanson 09** associate director and coordinating editor at CFR.org **2009** Stephanie “US Cuba Relations” Council on Foreign Relations 4/14 http://gees.org/documentos/Documen-03412.pdf

Given the range of issues dividing the two countries, experts say there is a long process that would precede resumption of diplomatic relations. Daniel P. Erikson of the InterAmerican Dialogue says that though "you could have the resumption of bilateral talks on issues related to counternarcotics or immigration, or a period of détente, you are probably not going to see the full restoration of diplomatic relations" in the near term.

Many recent policy reports have recommended that the United States take some unilateral steps to roll back sanctions on Cuba. The removal of sanctions, however, would be just one step in the process of normalizing relations. Such a process is sure to be controversial, as indicated by the heated congressional debate spurred in March 2009 by attempts to include provisions easing travel and trade restrictions in a large appropriations bill. These provisions passed in a March 10 vote. "Whatever we call it--normalization, detente, rapproachement--I think it is clear that the policy process risks falling victim to the politics of the issue," says Sweig.

**Energy boom makes heg resilient.**

**Johnson 12/2**, Tim, “Fuel boom key to U.S. superpower status?” http://www.santafenewmexican.com/news/fuel-boom-key-to-u-s-superpower-status/article\_82ae5b45-d49f-58d9-9832-8cae2d29b7f5.html)//DR. H

For the past 40 years, U.S. presidents have launched distant wars, allied with autocratic sheiks and dispatched naval fleets to protect sea lanes, all for the imperative of keeping foreign oil spigots flowing.

That imperative has now subsided. Rather suddenly, the center of gravity of global energy production has swung toward the Americas as shale oil and gas fields in North Dakota and Texas hum with activity. America is moving to the fore as the world’s largest producer of petroleum and natural gas. That change will reorder the globe in ways large and small.

U.S. experts say it will prolong the United States’ position as the predominant global superpower. Arab nations that shook the world with the 1973 oil embargo almost certainly will be weakened. Russia will find its power ebb as European nations find alternate suppliers for natural gas. New energy technologies will reorder the scales of global winners and losers.

**No impact to heg.**

**Ikenberry 08** – professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University (John, “The Rise of China and the Future of the West Can the Liberal System Survive?” Jan/Feb 2008, Foreign Affairs)

Some observers believe that the American era is coming to an end, as the Western-oriented world order is replaced by one increasingly dominated by the East. The historian Niall Ferguson has written that the bloody twentieth century witnessed "the descent of the West" and "a reorientation of the world" toward the East. Realists go on to note that as China gets more powerful and the United States' position erodes, two things are likely to happen: China will try to use its growing influence to reshape the rules and institutions of the international system to better serve its interests, and other states in the system -- especially the declining hegemon -- will start to see China as a growing security threat. The result of these developments, they predict, will be tension, distrust, and conflict, the typical features of a power transition. In this view, the drama of China's rise will feature an increasingly powerful China and a declining United States locked in an epic battle over the rules and leadership of the international system. And as the world's largest country emerges not from within but outside the established post-World War II international order, it is a drama that will end with the grand ascendance of China and the onset of an Asian-centered world order. That course, however, is not inevitable. The rise of China does not have to trigger a wrenching hegemonic transition. The U.S.-Chinese power transition can be very different from those of the past because China faces an international order that is **fundamentally different** from those that past rising states confronted. China does not just face the United States; it faces a Western-centered system that is open, integrated, and rule-based, with wide and deep political foundations. The nuclear revolution, meanwhile, has made war among great powers unlikely -- eliminating the **major tool** that rising powers have used to overturn international systems defended by declining hegemonic states. Today's Western order, in short, is hard to overturn and easy to join. This unusually durable and expansive order is itself the product of farsighted U.S. leadership. After World War II, the United States did not simply establish itself as the leading world power. It led in the creation of universal institutions that not only invited global membership but also brought democracies and market societies closer together. It built an order that facilitated the participation and integration of both established great powers and newly independent states. (It is often forgotten that this postwar order was designed in large part to reintegrate the defeated Axis states and the beleaguered Allied states into a unified international system.) Today, China can gain full access to and thrive within this system. And if it does, China will rise, but the Western order -- if managed properly -- will live on.

**Unworkable land and long-time frame**

**Soligo ‘10**

et al; Ronald Soligo is a professor emeritus of economics at Rice University and a Rice scholar at the James A. Baker III Institute for Public Policy. The author writes a chapter within the book “Cuba’s Energy Future: Strategic Approaches to Cooperation,” a Brookings Publication, edited by Jonathan Benjamin-Alvarado, PhD of Political Science, University of Nebraska –obtained as an ebook through MSU Electronic Resources – page 102

Three and a half billion gallons seems unrealistic for the foreseeable future. There is some question as to whether Cuba could ever again attain the 1.5 million hectares of sugarcane harvested in 1970, let alone 2 million. According to Brian Pollitt, the 1970 harvest was achieved only by cutting cane that would normally be left to mature for another season in order to produce a higher sugar yield in the following year. 48 Obviously this is not a sustainable practice if optimal yields are to be achieved. Two billion gallons can be produced with a harvested area of 1.33 million hectares and a yield of seventy-five tons per hectare. That area of cultivation is not too far from the average harvest of 1.28 million hectares that Cuba was able to maintain during the 1970s and 1980s. Yet reaching 1.33 million hectares will require time and substantial investment in farm machinery and restoration of the land, which has been neglected and compacted by the use of heavy Soviet-built harvesting machinery. The land will also have to be tilled and newly planted with sugarcane. Achieving higher sugarcane yields will also require time and investments to acquire or develop higher-yielding sugarcane varieties. Cuban yields averaged only fifty-eight tons per hectare during the 1970s and 1980s, substantially below the seventy-five tons per hectare needed to produce 2 billion gallons of ethanol. Yet other countries, as noted, have achieved or exceeded that yield, and some private Cuban farmers are reported to have achieved even higher yields of 100 tons per acre. 49 Yields, of course, are a function of other factors besides cane variety. The condition of the land, access to water and fertilizer, and other inputs would all need to be considered.

**Castro hates it**

**Specht ’12** (Jonathan – Legal Advisor, Pearlmaker Holsteins, Inc. B.A., Louisiana State University, 2009; J.D.,¶ Washington University in St. Louis 2012. “Raising Cane: Cuban Sugarcane Ethanol’s Economic and Environmental Effects on the United States” – ExpressO – <http://environs.law.ucdavis.edu/issues/36/2/specht.pdf>)

To speak of a Cuban sugarcane-based ethanol industry is, at this point, largely¶ a matter of speculation.¶ 46¶ Because of the anti-ethanol views of Fidel Castro (who¶ has said that ethanol should be discouraged because it diverts crops from food to¶ fuel),¶ 47¶ Cuba currently has almost no ethanol industry. In the words of Ronald¶ Soligo and Amy Myers Jaffe of the Brookings Institution, “Despite the fact that¶ Cuba is dependent on oil imports and is aware of the demonstrated success of¶ Brazil in using ethanol to achieve energy self-sufficiency, it has not embarked¶ on a policy to develop a larger ethanol industry from sugarcane.”¶ 48¶ There is,¶ however, no reason why such an industry cannot be developed. As Soligo and¶ Jaffe wrote, “In addition, Cuba has large land areas that once produced sugar but¶ now lie idle. These could be revived to provide a basis for a world-class ethanol¶ industry. We estimate that if Cuba achieves the yield levels attained in¶ Nicaragua and Brazil and the area planted with sugarcane approaches levels¶ seen in the 1970s and 1980s, Cuba coul¶ d produce up to 2 billion gallons of¶ sugar-based ethanol per year.”¶ 4

**Fidel’s shadow**

**Frank ‘8** Havana-based Reuters correspondent Marc Frank is a former writer for the People's Daily World – Reuters – Feb 22, 2008 – http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/02/22/cuba-castro-ethanol-idUSN2261316320080222

Cuba will only jump on the ethanol bandwagon if it can produce the biofuel from sugar cane as a by-product that does not affect its sugar output, local experts said on Friday.¶ Fidel Castro's retirement this week fueled speculation that ethanol could become a billion-dollar export industry for the cash-strapped communist country under his brother Raul Castro.¶ The younger Castro, who is expected to be confirmed as Cuba's new leader on Sunday, is considered less ideological and more pragmatic than his brother, and has indicated an interest in drawing more foreign investment in recent speeches.¶ But Fidel Castro is expected to retain huge influence in Cuba and he has repeatedly branded the use of food crops to produce fuel as a crime against humanity because rising prices will increase hunger.¶ A local economist with ties to the sugar industry said Cuba is working to develop technology to produce fuel from milled sugar cane bagasse. If successful, Cuba could become more interested in making ethanol, he said.¶ "It is inconceivable while Fidel is still alive that his brother Raul, or anyone else, would convert a significant proportion of our sugar crop or vacant land to ethanol," the economist said, asking not to be identified.¶ "Even after Fidel dies, I can't imagine that happening for quite some time," he said.

**Released important launch code info.**

**DT 01,** Daily Targum, 9/27/01, “Bad science,” [http://www.dailytargum.com/bad-science/article\_875fea7d-4835-5f47-b823-3eea10ec0657.html)//DR](http://www.dailytargum.com/bad-science/article_875fea7d-4835-5f47-b823-3eea10ec0657.html%29//DR). H

The government, following the Watergate scandal, went to Stanford University where Dr. Martin Hellman was doing research for a new method of cryptography, which would yield unbreakable codes. He planned to release the information to the public for use in the communications and financial industries. The National Security Agency, the agency in charge of encrypting and decrypting communications for the government, came to him and asked to control the release of the information gathered in his research. They claimed that people could use it against the U.S., and that it should be classified. Hellman and his team eventually got the information out, on the grounds that the NSA was violating his academic freedom.

**Consensus of experts.**

**Fay 13**, Matt, PhD student in the history department at Temple University, has a Bachelor’s degree in Political Science from St. Xavier University and a Master’s in International Relations and Conflict Resolution with a minor in Transnational Security Studies from American Military University, 7/18/13, “The Ever-Shrinking Odds of Nuclear Terrorism”, webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:HoItCUNhbgUJ:hegemonicobsessions.com/%3Fp%3D902+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=us&client=firefox-a

For over a decade now, one of the most oft-repeated threats raised by policymakers—the one that in many ways justified the invasion of Iraq—has been that of nuclear terrorism. Officials in both the Bush and Obama administrations, including the presidents themselves, have raised the specter of the atomic terrorist. But **beyond mere rhetoric, how likely is a nuclear terrorist attack** really?¶ While pessimistic estimates about America’s ability to avoid a nuclear terrorist attack became something of a cottage industry following the September 11th attacks, a number of scholars in recent years have pushed back against this trend. Frank Gavin has put post-9/11 fears of nuclear terrorism into historical context (pdf) and **argued against the prevailing alarmism**. Anne Stenersen of the Norwegian Defence Research Establishment has challenged the idea that al Qaeda was ever bound and determined to acquire a nuclear weapon. John **Mueller ridiculed the notion of nuclear terrorism** in his book Atomic Obsessions and highlighted the numerous steps a terrorist group would need to take—all of which would have to be successful—in order to procure, deliver, and detonate an atomic weapon. And in his excellent, and exceedingly even-handed, treatment of the subject, On Nuclear Terrorism, Michael Levi outlined the difficulties terrorists would face building their own nuclear weapon and discussed how a “system of systems” could be developed to interdict potential materials smuggled into the United States—citing a “Murphy’s law of nuclear terrorism” that could possibly dissuade terrorists from even trying in the first place.¶ But what about the possibility that a rogue state could transfer a nuclear weapon to a terrorist group? That was ostensibly why the United States deposed Saddam Hussein’s regime: fear he would turnover one of his hypothetical nuclear weapons for al Qaeda to use.¶ Enter into this discussion Keir Lieber and Daryl Press and their article in the most recent edition of International Security, “Why States Won’t Give Nuclear Weapons to Terrorists.” Lieber and Press have been writing on nuclear issues for just shy of a decade—doing innovative, if controversial work on American nuclear strategy. However, I believe this is their first venture into the debate over nuclear terrorism. And while others, such as Mueller, have argued that states are unlikely to transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists, this article is the first to tackle the subject with an empirical analysis.¶ The title of their article nicely sums up their argument: **states will not turn over nuclear weapons terrorists**. To back up this claim, Lieber and Press attack the idea that states will transfer nuclear weapons to terrorists because terrorists operate of absent a “return address.” Based on an examination of attribution following conventional terrorist attacks, the authors conclude:¶ [N]either a terror group nor a state sponsor would remain anonymous after a nuclear attack. We draw this conclusion on the basis of four main findings. First, data on a decade of terrorist incidents reveal a strong positive relationship between the number of fatalities caused in a terror attack and the likelihood of attribution. Roughly three-quarters of the attacks that kill 100 people or more are traced back to the perpetrators. Second, attribution rates are far higher for attacks on the U.S. homeland or the territory of a major U.S. ally—97 percent (thirty-six of thirty-seven) for incidents that killed ten or more people. Third, tracing culpability from a guilty terrorist group back to its state sponsor is not likely to be difficult: few countries sponsor terrorism; few terrorist groups have state sponsors; each sponsor terrorist group has few sponsors (typically one); and only one country that sponsors terrorism, has nuclear weapons or enough fissile material to manufacture a weapon. In sum, attribution of nuclear terror incidents would be easier than is typically suggested, and passing weapons to terrorists would not offer countries escape from the constraints of deterrence.¶ From this analysis, Lieber and Press draw two major implications for U.S. foreign policy: claims that it is impossible to attribute nuclear terrorism to particular groups or potential states sponsors undermines deterrence; and fear of states transferring nuclear weapons to terrorist groups, by itself, does not justify extreme measures to prevent nuclear proliferation.¶ This is a key point. While there are other reasons nuclear proliferation is undesirable, fears of nuclear terrorism have been used to justify a wide-range of policies—up to, and including, military action. Put in its proper perspective however—given the difficulty in constructing and transporting a nuclear device and the improbability of state transfer—**nuclear terrorism hardly warrants** the type of exertions many **alarmist assessments** indicate it should.

**Exaggerations - their authors look for the worst to validate their claims, this means their impact cards are apocalyptic nonsense**

**Potter 08 –** [William C. andMukhatzhanova Gaukhar**, \*** Sam Nunn and Richard Lugar Professor of Nonproliferation Studies and Director of the James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of International Studies and \*\* Research Associate at the James Martin Center, **“**Divining Nuclear Intentions: a review essay.” International Security, Vol. 33, No. 1 (Summer 2008), pp. 139–169, Google scholar]

For much of the nuclear age, academic experts, intelligence analysts, and public commentators periodically have forecast rapid bursts of proliferation, which have **failed to materialize**. Central to their prognoses, often imbued with the imagery and metaphors of nuclear dominoes and proliferation chains, has been the assumption that one state’s nuclearization is likely to trigger decisions by other states to “go nuclear” in quick succession. Today the proliferation metaphors of choice are “nuclear cascade” and “tipping point,” but the implication is the same—we are on the cusp of rapid, large-scale nuclear weapons spread. It is with some justification, therefore, that the study of proliferation has been labeled “the sky-is-still-falling profession.”1 Although proliferation projections abound, few of them are founded on, or even informed by, empirical research and theory.2 This deficiency, though regrettable, is understandable given the small body of theoretically or empirically grounded research on forecasting proliferation developments, and the underdeveloped state of theory on nonproliferation and nuclear decisionmaking more generally. Also contributing to this knowledge deficit is the stunted development of social science research on foreign policy–oriented forecasting and the emphasis on post hoc explanations, rather than predictions on the part of the more sophisticated frameworks and models of nuclear decisionmaking.